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Over the last decade Costa Rica has experienced a tremendous leap forward in the 
development of a technology and knowledge-driven economy.
1 Perhaps the better 
known part of this story is that an important group of high tech multinationals decided 
to establish manufacturing plants in the country. This group includes not only Intel and 
several other companies in the electronics sector (e.g., Remec, Sawtek, Conair, 
Reliability, Protek, Sensortronics, Colorplast), but also several companies in the 
medical devices sector, such as Abbott and Baxter. The country also appears to be 
benefiting from the IT led restructuring of large corporations, with the establishment of 
Procter and Gamble´s Global Business Center in the country (the largest GBS in the 
world!), as well as other service centers such as Western Union and IT technical support 
provider Sykes. 
The growing importance of knowledge and technology in the economy does not end 
with high tech multinationals, but reaches deeper into the economy, as evidenced by 
several domestic companies that are successfully competing worldwide in knowledge-
intensive sectors. The clearest example is the phenomenal growth of the domestic 
software sector, thanks to which today Costa Rica has the highest software exports per 
capita in Latin America. Two very significant signals of the country’s potential in 
software and design are associated with two recent decisions by Intel: first, it decided to 
invest in Costa Rica in the establishment of a center to develop software for the 
company and also to contribute in its semiconductor design processes, clearly moving 
beyond the assembly and testing plant it established just three years ago; second, 
through its venture capital fund, it invested in one of the most promising software 
companies in the country. All this goes together and is reinforced by the existence of 
                                                 
1 Taking out the impact of Intel, most of which is an accounting matter with little impact on the real 
economy, Costa Rica’s economy has been growing approximately 3% per year from 1994 until 2000. 
This is barely above the rate of population growth, and approximately equal to the rate of growth of the 
labor force. Thus, this is not a period of high growth in labor productivity. This may seem a contradiction 
with the statement that Costa Rica has experienced a “tremendous leap forward” in its technological 
development. The explanation is that the new technologically advanced sectors are still a small part of the 
economy, and the last years have been difficult for the rest of the economy as a result of both internal 
problems (mainly a high fiscal deficit and an inefficient financial system, both of which translate into a 
high lending interest rate) and external problems (worsening terms of trade and adverse climatic 
conditions).  internationally recognized centers of high quality training, education and research, such 
as Harvard-associate INCAE, Earth, CATIE, and INBio. 
How did all this come about? What is the strategy behind it and how was it formulated? 
What explains Intel’s decision to establish a plant in the country and how is this 
contributing to the economy’s transformation into a knowledge-driven economy? What 
lessons, if any, are there for other countries that wish to pursue similar development 
goals?  These are the questions that are explored in this paper. 
 
A national strategy? 
First of all, it should be emphasized that the positive technological developments 
experienced by Costa Rica in the last years are not the result of any collective and 
explicit decision. They are not the product of some charismatic leader who convinced 
the country to move in a particular direction.  There is no specific legislation nor a 
“grand national vision” that is responsible for them. Moreover, there are important 
disagreements within the country about the measures, reforms and adjustments that 
have to be made for Costa Rica to be successful in this new stage of our development. 
There are profound divergences about, for instance, the role of the state and the private 
sector in the delivery of public services, most notably telecommunications. And this 
should be no surprise. One cannot expect an open and pluralistic democracy like Costa 
Rica to achieve the kind of long term and unified national vision that was found in 
countries like Japan, Taiwan and Singapore. 
The fact is, as we will see below, that Costa Rica’s recent string of achievements in the 
technological area are the result of a series of mutually reinforcing policies and events 
(some of them dating back to the 19
th century) that have converged in the last years. 
What is important, however, is that there is no significant opposition to a development 
strategy based on technology and human capital with high tech multinationals playing a 
key role. This is perhaps because there is no clear alternative to this strategy; or perhaps 
it is because the momentum accumulated over the last years behind these developments 
seems unstoppable. This momentum becomes evident when one sees several different 
institutions – from the national agency in charge of attracting foreign investment to the 
public universities, from the ministry of education to the national institution in charge of telecommunications – all moving ahead with programs and projects that in 
complementary ways support the transition of the economy towards the new 
knowledge-intensive stage. 
 
The role of history 
The process by which the country has arrived to its current “national strategy” started 
very early, even going back to the first half of the 19
th century, with the strong emphasis 
about the importance of education for democracy and development. Already at the 
beginning of the last century Costa Rica had a literacy rate that was among the highest 
in the Americas. This commitment to education was later reinforced with the creation of 
the first public university of the 20
th century in 1940, which was later followed by the 
creation of three more public universities in the 1970s. The public universities generated 
the supply of scientists and engineers needed for the industrial sectors that grew in the 
1960s and 1970s under the import substitution model, and also for the state owned 
companies and institutions in telecommunications, electricity, agriculture, industry, 
water supply, and infrastructure. 
The decade of the 1980s was worse than a “lost decade” in terms of education for Costa 
Rica, with high-school enrollment rates falling significantly (only to recover to 1980 
levels by the end of the 1990s), but there was one initiative which would later contribute 
significantly to the country’s prospects for developing a technology and knowledge 
driven economy. This was the initiative to install computer labs in schools, a program 
that was later recognized around the world for two revolutionary characteristics: it 
concentrated on elementary schools, so that it could make a deeper impact on students; 
and it did not focus on teaching computer skills, but rather used the computer as a tool 
to aid in the general learning process.
2 
Without the investment in education that took place for almost two centuries, the 
current prospects for growth based on human capital would of course be impossible. 
                                                 
2 During the 1970s and 1980s there were other developments in the educational sector that would also 
prove important for the new economy: the growth of private universities, and the creation of technical or 
vocational high schools and public Junior Colleges. But this was, of course, insufficient. There is another part to the story that is more 
recent. 
After the crisis of the early 1980s, it became clear that the country had to abandon the 
import substitution model. The country then moved to an export promotion model, 
based primarily on trade liberalization (and access to the US market through the CBI) 
and two systems of fiscal incentives: the Export Processing Zone regime and the Export 
Contract.
3   
The Export Processing Zone regime allowed companies to import all their inputs and 
equipment tax free and avoid paying income tax for 8 years, paying only 50% of taxes 
due for the next 4 years.
4 This system was designed to attract FDI and would eventually 
become one key element in the attraction of high tech multinationals. In fact, a study by 
FIAS (Foreign Investment Advisory Service, a joint service of the International Finance 
Corporation and The World Bank) concluded that Costa Rica’s “free trade zone 
legislation has resulted in one of the better export procesing zone systems in the 
developing world.” (FIAS 1996, p. vi). 
Through the Export Contract, companies not only enjoyed an income tax holiday and 
tax free imports of equipment and inputs, but also received a generous subsidy 
equivalent to 10% of the value of their exports. This system was designed to help 
domestic companies change their strategy from one designed to the domestic and 
Central American Common Market towards one where they had to compete in open and 
competitive world markets. A parallel objective was to diversify the country’s 
agricultural exports away from the heavy dependence on coffee and bananas.  The 
subsidy was also justified as a way to compensate exporters for the inefficiencies in 
public services such as electricity, telecommunications, and ports, as well as the high 
costs of financial services like insurance and banking caused by the quasi-monopolistic 
structures that remained in those sectors. 
The strategy of trade liberalization, export promotion and attraction of FDI paid off, and 
the country attained moderate rates of growth in the second half of the 1980s and the 
early 1990s. It soon became evident, however, that the system placed a heavy burden on 
the fiscal system. The public debate that developed during the 1990s revolved around 
                                                 
3 In fact, fiscal incentives were important in making trade liberalization politically feasible. incentives, trade liberalization, and structural reform: the private sector argued that 
incentives and some degree of protection to local industry were necessary to 
compensate for the inefficiencies and distortions that existed in the country (mainly 
associated with the financial sector and public services like telecommunications and 
infrastructure). Economists and some policy makers argued that both incentives and 
distortions had to be eliminated simultaneously through structural reform. But the 
strong opposition from public sector unions and the political difficulties to pass reform 
bills through congress (given the lack of a strong majority for the governing party and 
the existence of congressional procedures that encouraged filibuster practices) made this 
very difficult and progress was frustratingly slow. 
During these years of debates about structural reform, political candidates and 
governments talked about policies and programs to support science and technology, but 
there was little substance and little funding, leading to small programs that had little 
impact on the economy.
5 So neither the big debate in the political arena, nor the public 
policies related to science and technology did much to determine the new vision. What 
really made the difference was happening elsewhere, behind the doors of CINDE. 
 
The CINDE story 
The transition to the new export promotion model was accompanied and supported from 
the beginning by CINDE, a private non-profit organization, founded in 1983 by 
prominent business people, supported by the Costa Rican government and financed by 
grants from the US-AID. Its broad objective was to help in the development of the 
economy, and to fulfill this objective it had several programs, but the attraction of FDI 
was always one of its top priorities. 
Through time, it gained very relevant expertise about the promotion of the country 
abroad and FDI attraction, mainly directed towards agriculture and unskilled-labor 
intensive manufacturing sectors, specially apparel maquiladoras. The success it 
achieved was in large part due to its institutional nature (non-political, non-
                                                                                                                                               
4 This system worked very well, the industrial parks were run by the private sector… 
5 The only exception is a project funded by an IDB loan approved in 1988, whose objectives were to 
strengthen the public universities’ research capacities and to achieve a closer relation between such 
research and the needs of the productive sector. governmental), which allowed it to have continuous programs and a long term strategy, 
without being affected by periodic changes in government. 
In the early 1990s CINDE realized that the country was losing competitiveness in 
unskilled-labor intensive industries to other members of the CBI and also due to the 
prospects for NAFTA, which would give Mexico a better access to the US market than 
the CBI members. At the same time, it was losing the sources of funding that it had 
enjoyed from its creation (US-AID). Given these circumstances, it decided to focus its 
FDI attraction efforts on fewer sectors, choosing the ones that were a better match for 
Costa Rica’s relatively high education levels  (i.e., skilled-labor intensive industries). 
For the strategic plan for 1993, CINDE focused on sectors associated with the electrical, 
electronic and telecommunications industries. These sectors not only required higher 
skilled labor, but were also experiencing fast growth in the US and the strong 
competitive pressures forced companies to search for low cost locations around the 
world. It was thought that these sectors were a particularly good match for Costa Rica 
not only because of Costa Rica’s good supply of technicians and engineers at relatively 
low cost, but also because of the widespread knowledge of English, the country’s well 
known political stability and democracy, as well as a developed legal system (i.e., rule 
of law) and low levels of corruption. Moreover, there was a high quality of life, with 
good access to health services, nightlife and cultural ammenities, and natural resources 
(for which the country was increasingly better known given the eco-tourism boom). In 
fact, there were already several companies in the electronics sector established in the 
country, among them Motorola, Trimpot, Sylvania, and Espion. 
The year 1995 confirmed that this strategy was right. That year DSC Communications  
Coporation decided to establish a manufacturing plant in Costa Rica (the largest 
industrial investment in the country up until then).
6 Sawtek Inc., Merrimac Industries, 
and Remec also chose to invest in the country. Thanks to these successes, CINDE 
acquired a deeper understanding of the industry, realizing for the first time that although 
Costa Rica had a unique competitive advantage for these sectors in relation to the other 
members of the CBI, it was now competing against countries in other regions. In 
                                                 
6 The investment by DSC was also significant because it was the first Printed Circuits Board (PCB) 
assembly plant in the country. addition to Mexico, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, it was now competing 
against countries such as Ireland, Chile, Israel, and Thailand. 
Thanks to this increased understanding of the electronics industry, CINDE learned that 
Intel was starting the site selection process for an assembly and testing plant for one of 
their newest chips. Costa Rica was not on the “long list,” so – in spite of some 
skepticism from their highest authorities – CINDE’s specialists on FDI attraction started 
a campaign to make sure that it was included in the list. Thanks to the know how that 
CINDE had accumulated through many years of attracting FDI and through a few years 
of focusing on the electronics industry, they were able to put together an effective 
presentation of the country and finally enter the list in November of 1995.  
The next step was a visit from Intel to Costa Rica in April of 1996. After this visit,  
Costa Rica became of the top contenders in the list, which at that stage included 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Puerto Rico, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
7  Having already three plants in Asia (Malaysia, 
China and Philippines), Intel decided it was necessary to diversify, so it dropped the 
Asian countries from the list. Additional research involving many visits by Intel 
representatives to the different locations narrowed down the list to just four countries: 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile and Mexico. 
“Chile’s lack of emphasis on the electronics sector and air transportation logistics made 
it an awkward strategic fit for Intel. Brazil, on the other hand, hat a lot to offer but Intel 
felt the business environment, at that time, would not be suited to the type of operation 
they were considering.” (Spar, p. 10). Finally, Intel rejected Mexico because of its 
mandatory union rules and the fact that the incentives it offered were specific to Intel 
and somewhat discretionary, making them less credible and inferior to Costa Rica’s 
more general and stable conditions. Intel finally announced its choice of Costa Rica on 
November of 1996. 
Based on personal interviews and on the FIAS study by Deborah Spar (Attracting High 
Tech Technology: Intel’s Costa Rican Plant), four factors emerge as the ones that made 
Intel choose Costa Rica for the location of its plant: 
                                                 
7 The best source of information about Intel´s site-selection process is the FIAS study by Deborah Spar 
(Attracting High Tech Technology: Intel’s Costa Rican Plant). For the purposes of this paper, I 
complement the Spar study with personal interviews with Intel and CINDE representatives. 1)  The general country characteristics provided a favorable basis to attract skilled-
intensive FDI: political and social stability; high quality of life; rule of law and low 
levels of corruption; relatively high levels of economic freedom, particularly with 
regards to international trade and capital flows; relatively high levels of education 
(specially engineers and technical operators) with acceptable knowledge of English 
at low cost; a non-union work environment; a “pro-business” environment with a 
favorable attitude towards FDI; a good package of incentives that had clearly 
defined procedures and conditions and was not subject to arbitrary negotiation (the 
EPZ system); and good location and transportation logistics. 
2)  The country’s growing emphasis and success in attracting high tech FDI. This gave 
credibility to the case presented by CINDE and the Costa Rican Government that 
the country had the professional human resources required for an operation like the 
one Intel was planning. Furthermore, this allowed Intel to talk to representatives of 
several high tech multinationals with plants in the country when it visited the 
country in its site-selection process. According to Spar, the glowing reports and 
optimism of the executives at the Baxter and DSC plants were a decisive factor for 
Intel to put Costa Rica at one of the top positions of the list of countries it was 
considering for the investment. 
3)  The existence of an aggressive, effective and knowledgeable foreign investment 
promotion agency like CINDE. Not only was CINDE important in convincing Intel 
to consider Costa Rica as a possible location for its plant, but it was also extremely 
helpful to Intel in conducting its research and obtaining the credible and consistent 
information they demanded. Moreover, its links and credibility with the government 
allowed it to play a key role in arranging successful meetings between Intel 
executives and Government authorities. 
4)  A Government that quickly understood the importance of an Intel investment in the 
country. The president personally got involved not only in meeting Intel executives 
and conveying a very strong interest in its investment, but also in motivating and 
coordinating the rest of the Government to help Intel as much as they could within 
the limits of the laws and regulations that existed. In fact, the Government was very 
diligent in responding to Intel’s concerns in areas like education, electricity and 
taxes. It most be point out, however, that the concessions made were not special to Intel, but were generally applicable to other companies as long as they met the 
required conditions. In this sense, it could be argued that these were not 
concessions, but rather Intel-inspired reforms to improve the country’s 
competitiveness.
8 This is perhaps the main reason why there was almost no 
opposition to Intel’s investment nor to the incentives it received.
9 
With Intel’s decision to establish its assembly and testing plant in the country, it became 
clear that attracting high tech multinationals to the country was feasible and potentially 
effective as part of the development strategy of the country. What was until then a 
CINDE strategy, became a national strategy. 
 
The FIAS study 
There was another important input in the definition of the high tech FDI attraction 
strategy. CINDE was clear that there were weaknesses in Costa Rica’s economy that 
needed to be addressed if the country was to be successful in attracting FDI in 
electronics. Moreover, it was necessary to develop a deeper understanding of the 
electronics industry so as to better design its FDI attraction efforts. With this in mind, 
CINDE hired FIAS in 1996 to develop “A Strategy for Foreign Investment in Costa 
Rica’s Electronics Industry.”  
The study’s main finding was that: 
                                                 
8 Briefly, the reforms were the following. In the education area, they included the addition of a one-year 
“certificate” program focused on technical skills and physics/chemistry competency and a one-year 
“Associate Degree” program focused on semiconductor manufacturing. These reforms came from 
recommendations made by a special committee that was set-up for this purpose and was composed among 
others by the Minister of Education and the Minister of Science and Technology. In the area of electricity, 
the rates were very high, so the Government asked the regulator to establish a new lower rate for energy-
intensive industrial facilities.  Finally, in the area of taxes, there was an ambiguity in the applicability of a 
new tax to companies in the EPZ system, so the government asked requested a formal interpretation from 
the Attorney General, which turned out favorable to Intel and other companies then entering to the EPZ 
system. 
9 In fact, when Intel’s investment in Costa Rica was announced jointly with the Government, the 
President went out of his way to point out that Intel’s decision came from the many positive attributes of 
the country and its people, and not thanks to any special incentives or concessions given to the company. 
A few problems did arise later on, but these came not from opposition to the strategy of attracting high-
tech FDI, but were rather problems typically encountered in the country during the construction of large 
manufacturing plants, such as neighbors’ concerns about waste disposal and archeologists’ concerns 
about protecting pre-Colombian ruins. Those concerns were dealt with very positively by Intel and public 
concerns were quickly put to rest by its “good citizen” behavior. “There is a basis for substantial expansion of foreign direct investment in the electronics 
industry in Costa Rica… The niches for Costa Rica would not involve mass market products, 
but rather those with smaller production runs that require relatively large inputs of skilled labor 
for set-ups and testing. The most attractive niches can be grouped into four basic technology 
areas, as follows: power technologies, PC cards and surface mount technologies, system 
integration technologies, call centers… Such products draw heavily on the main advantage that 
Costa Rica has to offer the world electronics industry: this is the labor force that is relatively 
well educated in relation to its cost. The education advantage covers a wide range, from 
operatives to technicians and engineers. There is also a widespread knowledge of English… A 
number of the companies in CR are already producing power technology products, including 
transformers of various types… DSC Communications and a few other companies are already 
employing surface mount technologies in Costa Rica... Systems integration technologies put 
electronics together with other inputs to produce specific products (like medical devices)... 
Finally, the FIAS team feels that there is a substantial opportunity for developing call centers to 
support the electronics industry, as ACER is doing now.” 
 
The FIAS study also suggested promoting the sectors that support the electronics 
industry, such as plastics, metal working, mold making and equipment service and 
repair. This would help in the development of “clusters” and increase the country’s 
competitiveness in these areas. The recommendation was that this should be done 
through FDI attraction in these areas as well as through backward linkage programs to 
develop such industries domestically. This, of course, was just the strategy that 
suggested itself after Intel decided to invest here. 
Finally, FIAS noted several obstacles to the development of the electronics sector in the 
country. In particular, it noted weaknesses and recommended improvements in 
Intellectual Property Rights legislation, in telecommunications and transportation 
infrastructure, in the public system to support training, and also in the low quantity of 
technicians and engineers with English proficiency graduating from educational centers. 
 
From the FIAS study to the present 
CINDE accepted the FIAS study and used it for the definition of its strategic plan for 
the following years. In fact, for the 1997 plan CINDE stated its objective to position 
Costa Rica as “the emerging electronics manufacturing center in the Americas.”  The 
idea of fostering the development of clusters in certain skilled-intensive sectors was 
later reinforced by “Competitiveness Agenda for Central America towards the 21
st 
Century” carried out jointly by INCAE and the Harvard Institute for International 
Development (led in this endeavor by Michael Porter and Jeffrey Sachs). This report emphasized the opportunities Costa Rica had in electronics and software and 
recommended the “cluster approach” to improve competitiveness in these areas. 
In the following years, additional research allowed CINDE to continue improving and 
refining its high-tech FDI attraction strategy. This research led it to include the medical 
devices sector among its targeted sectors. Again, just as had happened earlier with the 
electronics sector, success came early, this time in the form of the decision by Abbott 
Laboratories to establish a sophisticated $60 million manufacturing plant in the country 
in 1998 and Baxter’s decision to expand its presence in the country wth a $30 million 
investment. New opportunities opened up later in the business services sector with 
Procter and Gamble’s decision to establish a GBS for the Americas in the country, with 
the expectation of hiring up to 1,500 professionals. 
Today, the country is following a strategy that appears to enjoy strong support from 
many different groups, and that includes not only CINDE’s continuing efforts to attract 
high tech multinationals, but also an IDB-sponsored program to help SMEs become 
their suppliers and initiatives to improve the availability of the human resources needed 
for the new development model.
10 This is complemented by more general policies that 
include improving telecommunications (specially for the Internet and data 
transmission), improving infrastructure through private sector participation, improving 
IPR protection (the required legislative changes have already been in compliance with 
the Uruguay Round), and developing better access to foreign markets through free trade 
agreements with countries such as Mexico, Chile and Canada. 
 
II - The Impact of Intel on Costa Rica
11 
When Intel announced its decision to invest in Costa Rica, it projected its investment to 
be somewhere between $300 and $500 million. By December of 1999, it had already 
invested $390 million and was employing more than 2,200 people with wages much 
                                                 
10 Among these initiatives, worthy of comment are a large scale project financed by a grant from Taiwan 
to bring up to date the curricula and equipment for technical education in a few key sectors (informatics, 
electronics, metal working and mold making),
10 and also the effort by public universities to increase and 
improve their programs for technicians, engineers and other professionals. This effort, it should be noted, 
receives strong support from Intel.  
11 This section draws heavily from Larraín, López-Calva and Rodríguez-Clare (2001), complemented by 
interviews from Intel and CINDE personnel.  higher than the average wage in the manufacturing sector.
12 For an economy with a 
GDP of less than $12.5 billion in 1997 and a labor force of  just above one million 
people, this was an extraordinarily large investment. In fact, in the year 1999 Intel 
accounted for more than 60% of the total growth experienced that year and almost 40% 
of total exports. Thanks to Intel’s operation, the openness ratio (imports plus exports 
over GDP) increased from 70% in 1997 to 83% in 1998 and in 1999 Costa Rica run a 
trade surplus for the first time in decades.  
But all these effects are the ones anybody should expect from such a large investment in 
a small country. Of much more interest and relevance is the impact that Intel had on 
Costa Rica’s ability to attract high tech FDI and on the economy’s general 
competitiveness in skilled-intensive industries. 
It is without question that having “Intel Inside” has helped Costa Rica’s efforts in 
attracting high tech FDI. Intel’s decision to invest in Costa Rica became news 
worldwide, and it tremendously improved the country’s image as a viable economy and 
as an attractive investment location for high tech companies. In fact, in a survey carried 
out in 1999 among possible investors, 72 percent of respondents claimed that they had 
heard, seen, and read more about CR as an investment prospect after Intel’s decision to 
set up a plant in the country. Given Intel’s reputation for its rigorous site-selection 
research, other companies can in a sense “free ride” on Intel’s research and be much 
more confident about investing in the country. “Intel Inside” became a credible “stamp 
of approval” for Costa Rica as a investment location.  
With this “stamp of approval” as its main selling point, CINDE launched a strong 
campaign to attract other large electronic manufacturers as well as Intel’s worldwide 
suppliers to invest in Costa Rica. In fact, on the day that Intel announced its investment, 
the Minister of Foreign Trade predicted that the country could attract around 40 Intel 
satellite companies. The objective was not only to increase overall FDI but also to form 
the electronics cluster that was envisioned in the 1996 FIAS study and in the 
INCAE/HIID’s Competitiveness Agenda.  
                                                 
12 As of September of 1999, the average wage for Intel was $615 whereas the average wage for the 
manufacturing sector was $406. This, of course, is in large part due to the fact that Intel hires people with 
higher educational levels: out of the 2,217 workers it had at that time, more than 500 were professional 
employees, most of them engineers. 
 Unfortunately, the Asian Crisis of 1997 together with an industry downturn at a global 
scale significantly reduced the flows of FDI in the electronics sector. As example of 
this, Seagate – a large scale manufacturer of hard disk units – was forced to abandon its 
intent to establish a 5,000 employee manufacturing plant for which it had already 
bought the land.  Advanced negotiations with Lucent also failed as a consequence. 
Furthermore, many of Intel’s suppliers refused to invest in the country on the basis that 
they would be selling to a single buyer. This made the investment too risky.
13 A few 
Intel satellites did set up in the country. Examples are RVSI, NTK, Phillips, Magnéticos 
Toroid de Costa Rica, Tiros, Alphasem Corp., Delta Design S.A. and Esec USA, Inc. 
But most of these are small operations, with very few employees, and contribute little to 
the formation of the desired electronics cluster.
14 
All this should not in any way make the reader think that Intel did not generate a 
positive impact through backward linkages. On the contrary, in less than three years of 
operations, Intel has forced a significant improvement in the logistics area. As an 
example, FedEx and UPS have initiated operations in the country and thanks to that 
there are now daily cargo flights to several destinations in the United States. Moreover, 
AirExpress International, an international logistics and transportation company with a 
close business relation with Intel, invested in the country through a joint venture with a 
local company. 
Backward linkages have also developed through domestic companies that supply Intel 
with specialized goods and services. As a survey among Intel suppliers carried out by 
Larraín, López-Calva and Rodríguez-Clare (2001) shows, a significant percentage of 
Intel suppliers declared to have received training from Intel or to have changed their 
organizational practices or even to have introduced changes in their product variety due 
to Intel. A survey among Intel competitors in inputs markets (carried out by the same 
                                                 
13 The largest Intel supplier that invested in Costa Rica was Photocircuits. In January of 1998, this 
company announced a $40 million investment to produce the board on which Intel’s semiconductors are 
mounted. The fast technological change characteristic of this industry, however, later led Intel to stop 
buying the boards from Photocircuits, providing a clear example of the risk involved in setting up a plant 
to supply a single buyer. As an interesting development, Photocircuits refused to close down operations 
completely, because it valued the workers it had hired and trained. It thus restructured its investment 
towards a center for the design of boards it produces in other locations. 
14 Another setback on the road towards the formation of the electronics cluster was the announcement by 
DSC Communications Corporation that it would close down its operation in the country. According to the 
statements made by the company, this in no way reflected a lack of competitiveness of the country, but 
rather obeyed the company’s internal dynamics.  authors) reinforces the impression that Intel has generated changes in inputs markets 
from which other companies have also benefited. In fact, “eight firms maintained that 
some supplier of inputs had improved their quality after Intel’s arrival, and specifically 
mentioned a certain type of service. As an example, packaging was mentioned as an 
input that had become more sophisticated in some specific firm, directly or indirectly 
due to Intel’s demand for similar services.” (Larraín et. al. (2001), p. 189). This second 
survey also revealed that most companies among those classified as Intel competitors in 
input markets thought that Intel had a positive effect on their own operations, and a very 
positive effect on the overall economy.  
Apart from backward linkages, Intel has generated significant externalities through two 
other channels: training of its own workforce and support of educational programs in 
public universities. Intel invests heavily in the training of its employees, many of them 
even travel to and stay for several months at Intel’s other plants. A significant part of 
this training is firm specific and Intel manages to keep turnover at a very low level, so 
only a small part of this training constitutes an externality. Still, one already hears of 
some “spin-offs,” in which a few employees have quitted to set up their own operations, 
selling services to Intel and eventually to other local firms. 
Perhaps the most important mechanism so far through which Intel has benefited the 
economy is in its collaboration with public universities to improve their curriculum and 
teacher training in technical fields. This has happened particularly with the Instituto 
Tecnológico de Costa Rica (ITCR), which, under its “Intel Associate” status, has 
introduced new degree programs, has strengthened and updated its teachers’ knowledge 
in several technical fields, and has improved its financial position.  
More generally, the mere presence of Intel in the country has increased the awareness 
about career opportunities in technical fields and engineering, leading to a very 
significant increase in enrollment in technical fields at public universities. “At the 
ITCR, for instance, the number of students enrolled in engineering fields grew from 577 
in the first quarter of 1997 to 874 in the year 2000, that is, from 9.5% to 12.5% of the 
total number of students enrolled” (Larraín et. al. (2001), p. 184). 
To sum up, in only three years of operations in the country, Intel has had a strong 
beneficial impact on the country’s competitiveness through its implicit “stamp of approval” on the country as an investment location for high tech multinationals and 
through its support of technical education in public universities. It has generated 
moderate benefits through backward linkages (both through leading a few of its 
satellites to set up in the country and through beneficial effects on domestic backward 
suppliers from which other domestic companies have benefited) and through 
externalities associated with labor training.  
 
III – Lessons for Other Countries 
 
We have seen that Costa Rica’s recent string of successes in its transition towards a 
technology and knowledge-driven economy is the result not of an explicit and collective 
decision, or of a grand national vision that pointed in this direction, but rather it is the 
result of several different policies and events, some of them dating back to the 19
th 
century, that reinforced each other and converged in the last years. This makes it all the 
more difficult to extract specific lessons for other countries.  
Still, some general observations may be of value to other countries:  
First, it is clear that Costa Rica’s long term commitment to investing in education has 
been the most important factor behind the recent developments. As the FIAS study 
confirmed, the country’s main competitive advantage lies with a labor force that is well 
educated relative to its cost. Countries should not only focus on increasing coverage of 
primary and secondary education, but should also put in place technical high schools 
and universities that guarantee a steady stream of technicians and professionals in the 
areas where the country has a competitive advantage. 
Second, many of the now dominant recommendations for economic development are 
validated: political and economic stability; rule of law, transparency and low levels of 
corruption; economic liberalization, both with regards to international flows of goods 
and capital; a “pro-business” environment with a favorable attitude towards FDI. 
Third, it appears that the Export Processing Zone system was an important element in 
the attraction of FDI in the Costa Rican case. Yet, due to the Uruguay Round agreement 
to eliminate export subsidies by the year 2003 in all developing countries, other countries that want to adopt a similar strategy will have to do without this kind of 
incentives. One obvious alternative, but not without its costs, will be to establish 
aggresively low corporate income tax rates. 
Fourth, CINDE played an essential role not only in attracting FDI but also in 
determining a strategy geared towards the electronics sector that would later prove 
succesful for the country.  The fact that it is a non-profit organization, with strong ties to 
both the private sector and the public sector, with no special relation to any interest 
group, with strong financial support, together with its apolitical nature, seems to have 
provided CINDE with the required characteristics to play such a profund role. Thanks to 
its nature, this organization was able to establish long term goals, do the required 
detailed and careful research, get the appropiate expertise and human resources, be 
selective in its approach towards FDI and make sure that its efforts matched the 
country’s competitive strengths. 
Fifth, looking at the recent development in Costa Rica, it seems that countries should 
carefully identify the sectors where the country has a strong competitive advantage and 
thus high growth potential, and make sure that economic policy is consistent with the 
needs of these sectors. It is not about picking winners, nor about fiscal incentives (as in 
the infant industry proposal). What is important is to direct the scarce government 
attention towards policies that are particularly important for the growth of the promising 
sectors. This, for instance, is what lies behind the Costa Rican program to strengthen the 
technical schools in the areas of informatics, electronics and metal working and mold 
making. This is also the rationale for its program to support the development of local 
suppliers to high tech multinationals.  
Sixth, one of the factors that makes one think that the Costa Rican strategy will be 
mainteined at least in the medium term is that the responsibility is spread among many 
different actors in society. It is not only the Government that is running programs to 
strengthen the technical capacity of the country, but several other organizations are also 
helping, among them public universities, industry chambers, technical schools, and 
CINDE.  
Seventh, the case of Intel’s decision to invest in Costa Rica shows very clearly the 
importance of transportation logistics for high tech companies, whose products exhibit high rates of innovation (and thus require fast shipment of goods from factory to 
consumers) and a high value relative to size and weight. High quality aiport systems and 
friendly and open policies towards air travel and cargo companies seem very advisable.  
And finally, rather than give special concessions to particular companies to lure them to 
invest in the country, it is more advisable to adopt policies and implement reforms that 
are of general applicability but that are particularly important for the companies whose 
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